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Windsor and the Symposium
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Unidirectional and Bidirectional
Models of Supreme Court
Decision Making
Ronald Kahn†
Abstract
This Article explores the landmark case of United States v.
Windsor, which ruled that Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act
(“DOMA”) was unconstitutional on Due Process and Equal
Protection grounds. The Article examines the ways in which the
Windsor decision builds upon rights and polity principles from
previous gay rights cases, such as Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v.
Texas, and contributes to a line of doctrine that exemplifies
“bidirectional” Supreme Court decision making.
The Article’s starting point is the observation that from 1969 to
2006, thirteen of the fifteen appointees to the Supreme Court have
been by Republican presidents. The Article asks why rights created in
the Warren and Burger Court eras have not only been preserved, but
in many instances have been strengthened. In other words, why does
a conservative Court in our present conservative political age make
significant decisions based on strong rights principles and a concern
for minority interests?
The answer lies in the nature of Supreme Court decision making,
which is viewed as unique and different from the way that political
institutions—more directly accountable to popular opinion and
election results—craft law and policy. The Supreme Court engages in
the bidirectional, mutual construction of text, precedent, and doctrine
and the lived lives of persons outside the Court. At the heart of
bidirectional decision making is a social construction process. Social
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constructions become as much a part of cases, precedents, and the
case before the Supreme Court as are rights principles. In any given
case, the Court brings the internal world of its jurisprudence into
conversation with the realities of the world beyond its walls, thereby
constructing new avenues of doctrine and precedent that draw on
both constitutional text and case law that precede them and the
social constructions in precedents.
The model of bidirectional Court decision making—“Model 2”—is
juxtaposed against a Model 1, unidirectional explanation of Supreme
Court decision making. Scholars employing Model 1 explanations of
Court decision making assert that justices on the Court makes
decisions based on either internal elements—such as constitutional
text or legal precedent—or factors external to the Court—such as
politics, legal advocacy, personal ideological affiliation or policy wants
of justices, or the views of presidents who made Court appointments.
Model 1 scholars accept what Brian Tamanaha calls the “formalistrealist divide,” a separation that is absent from Model 2 scholarship.
Most constitutional theorists, including Mark Tushnet, Cass Sunstein,
Randy Barnett, and old and new originalists, such as Antonin Scalia
and Jack M. Balkin, respectively, also accept the divide and fail to
recognize the bidirectionality of Court decision making in their
theories of what the Court should do when it makes constitutional
choices, and also are found wanting for doing so.
The Article concludes with an examination of the contributions to
this Symposium in light of the above analysis. It investigates the
Articles presented, dividing them into three groups—Doctrinal,
Institutional, and Policy—based on the primacy focus of each
symposium contribution. Each contribution is discussed with respect
to Windsor as a clear and forceful example of bidirectional Court
decision making and the efficacy of Model 2 explanations of Court
decision making as predictors of future Court action.

Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................ 1295
I.

Unidirectional and Bidirectional Models of Court
Decision Making ............................................................................... 1302
A. Background: The Formalist-Realist Divide .................................... 1302
B. Model 1: Unidirectional Model for Explaining What a Court Does,
or Should Do ............................................................................ 1304
C. Model 2: Court Decision Making as a Bidirectional, Mutual
Construction Process ................................................................. 1308

II.

United States v. Windsor: A Product of Bidirectional
Supreme Court Decision Making ................................................. 1309

III. Unidirectional and Bidirectional Methods of Analysis in
Symposium Contributions ............................................................... 1314
A. Doctrinal Analyses ..................................................................... 1315

1294

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 3·2014
Understanding United States v. Windsor and the Symposium Contributions
Using Unilateral and Bilateral Models of Supreme Court Decision Making
1. Nancy C. Marcus ......................................................................... 1315
2. Sherif Girgis................................................................................. 1318
3. Maggie Gallagher and William C. Duncan .................................. 1321
4. Andrew Koppelman ..................................................................... 1322
5. Ernest A. Young .......................................................................... 1325
B. Institutional Analyses ................................................................. 1326
1. Robert F. Nagel ........................................................................... 1326
2. Robin Fretwell Wilson................................................................. 1329
3. Susan J. Becker ........................................................................... 1332
4. Nancy Scherer ............................................................................. 1335
C. Policy Analyses .......................................................................... 1337
1. Helen M. Alvaré .......................................................................... 1337
2. Frances Goldscheider ................................................................... 1338
Conclusion.................................................................................................... 1339

Introduction
One would have expected the Supreme Court in the late
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries—and now—to be
conservative. Since 1969, when President Richard Nixon named
Warren Burger as Chief Justice, through President George W. Bush’s
appointments of Chief Justice John Roberts in 2005 and Justice
Samuel Alito in 2006, Republican presidents have made thirteen of
fifteen appointments to the Supreme Court, thus constituting a clear
majority of appointees in any given year.1
The Supreme Court, however, “has not overturned any of the
major individual rights cases from the progressive Warren Court era
(1954–1969). Moreover, during the years under Chief Justice Warren
Burger (1969–1986), the Supreme Court expanded individual rights in

1.

President Nixon appointed Chief Justice Burger (1969), Justice Blackmun
(1970), Justice Powell (1972), and Justice Rehnquist (1972). President
Gerald Ford appointed Justice Stevens (1975). President Jimmy Carter
had no appointees to the Supreme Court. President Ronald Reagan
appointed Justice O’Connor (1981), reappointed Justice Rehnquist as
Chief Justice in 1986, appointed Justice Scalia (1986), and Justice
Kennedy (1988). President George Herbert Walker Bush appointed
Justice Souter (1990) and Justice Thomas (1991). President Bill Clinton
appointed Justice Ginsburg (1993) and Justice Breyer (1994). Not until
2005, eleven years later, would any President make additional
appointments to the Supreme Court. In 2005, Republican President
George W. Bush appointed John Roberts as Chief Justice. One year later,
Bush appointed Justice Alito. For a list of all Supreme Court nominations
from 1789 to the present, including those listed above, see Members of the
Supreme Court of the United States, Supreme Ct. U.S., http://www.
supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last visited April 14, 2014)
[hereinafter Members of Supreme Court]. More recently, President Barack
Obama appointed Justice Sotomayor (2005) and Justice Kagan (2010). Id.
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significant ways,”2 such as deciding that a woman has a constitutional
right to elect abortion in Roe v. Wade,3 that gender classifications
under the law would be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny in
Craig v. Boren,4 and that race can be one factor among many in the
admission of students to colleges and universities in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke.5
During the Rehnquist Court, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
right to abortion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey6 and overturned Bowers v. Hardwick7 and extended the
2.

Ronald Kahn, Why Does a Moderate/Conservative Supreme Court in a
Conservative Age Expand Gay Rights?: Lawrence v. Texas (2003), in
Legal and Political Time, in 44 Stud. in L. Pol’y & Soc’y 173, 174
(Austin Sarat ed., 2008).

3.

410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“This right of privacy, whether it be founded in
the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions
upon state action, as we feel it is, or, . . . in the Ninth Amendment’s
reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” (emphasis added)).

4.

429 U.S. 190, 197–98 (1976). Justice Rehnquist would have used a
“rational basis” approach, id. at 217–18 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and
criticized the rationale for treating sex as a suspect classification, “the
plurality [in Frontiero v. Richardson] rested its invocation of strict
scrutiny largely upon the fact that ‘statutory distinctions between the
sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of
females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities
of its individual members.’” Id. at 218 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 686–87 (1973) (plurality opinion)).

5.

438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (“[R]ace or ethnic
background may be deemed a ‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file, yet it
does not insulate the individual from comparison with all other
candidates for the available seats.”).

6.

505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). To ascertain whether or not Casey simply
upheld Roe technically, or was in fact rights expansive, one must do
more than an analysis in policy terms of whether the Pennsylvania
abortion law has made it more difficult or easier in the short run to
obtain an abortion; one would have to explore whether the right itself is
more or less fundamental by reviewing the evolution of Supreme Court
decisions addressing this issue. In this regard, I would argue that the
Casey decision upheld the fundamental right to choose an abortion, and
in important ways made the right more fundamental. The jettisoning of
the trimester framework in Casey was a significant step in expanding
the right to choose abortion because it did away with medical science as
the framework within which the right to choose abortion rested. See id.
at 872–73 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (rejecting the trimester approach
established in Roe). Arguably, Casey removed the collision course that
would undermine the right to choose, as medical science now allows
fetuses to be kept alive closer to conception, albeit with scientific aids,
and women likewise have safer abortions closer to term. Also, in
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 156–57 (2007), the most recent
Supreme Court case addressing “partial birth abortions,” the Supreme
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implied fundamental rights of privacy and personhood to
homosexuals, specifically in terms of the right to sexual intimacy, in
Lawrence v. Texas8 (thereby overturning Bowers v. Hardwick). As
well, the Court reaffirmed the Bakke principle that race may play a
role in university admissions in Grutter v. Bollinger,9 and even
heightened the level of scrutiny of gender classifications in United
States v. Virginia (VMI).10 Most importantly, in Romer v. Evans,11 a
6–3 decision, the Rehnquist Court invalidated a Colorado
constitutional amendment that required all laws relating to
homosexuals to be valid only through the process of amending
Colorado’s constitution.12 The Court said this initiative by the people

Court reinforced the fundamentality of the right to choose, but also
recognized that certain abortion methods carry greater risks. Justice
Kennedy openly recognized the practice of lethal injections for fetuses.
Id. at 136. Moreover, as both Roe and Casey seem to suggest, there
remains the possibility that a state could pass a law today that would
permit women to choose an abortion up to term so long as the law takes
into consideration those standards of humanity espoused in Gonzales.
See id. at 157–60 (discussing Congress’s desire to promote “respect for
human life”).
7.

478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003).

8.

539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (“When homosexual conduct is made criminal
by the law of the State, that declaration . . . is an invitation to subject
homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the
private spheres. The central holding of Bowers . . . demeans the lives of
homosexual persons.”).

9.

539 U.S. 306, 336–37 (2003) (“When using race as a ‘plus’ factor in
university admissions, a university's admissions program must remain
flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an
individual and not in a way that makes an applicant's race or ethnicity
the defining feature of his or her application. The importance of this
individualized consideration in the context of a race-conscious
admissions program is paramount.”); see Bakke, 438 U.S. at 518 n.52
(“The denial . . . of this right to individualized consideration without
regard to his race is the principal evil of petitioner’s special admissions
program.”).

10.

518 U.S. 515, 531–34 (1996); see id. at 573 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority opinion’s application of intermediate scrutiny to
the facts of the case, noting that “[o]nly the amorphous ‘exceedingly
persuasive justification’ phrase, and not the standard elaboration of
intermediate scrutiny, can be made to yield this conclusion that VMI’s
single-sex composition is unconstitutional because there exist several
women . . . willing and able to undertake VMI’s program”).

11.

517 U.S. 620 (1996).

12.

Id. at 627, 635–36.
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was invalid because it was based on pure animus against homosexuals
and, thus, was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.13
Even with the addition to the Court of Chief Justice Roberts in
2005 and Justice Alito in 2006,14 the Supreme Court refused to
overrule landmark cases. For example, in Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,15 the Court
refused to find that race could not be a factor in attempts by school
boards to diversify public schools.16 Similarly, in Fisher v. University
of Texas at Austin,17 the Court under Chief Justice Roberts reaffirmed
the principles of Bakke and Grutter by allowing the continuation of
race to be one “plus factor” among many in the University of Texas’s
undergraduate admissions process.18
This is not to say that the Roberts Court has not had an impact
on doctrinal change. For example, the Roberts Court has generally
been pro-business, dramatically reducing access to federal courts by
those seeking to use class action suits to limit what many feel are
discriminatory corporation policies, as well as reducing the impact of
required arbitration agreements for those interacting with businesses.19
The Court also has defined new individual rights. In 2008, it
established an individual right to keep and bear arms in the District
of Columbia v. Heller20 decision. Similarly, in National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius,21 there is a stunning definition of a
new individual right or liberty interest under the Commerce Clause
that protects a person from being forced into interstate commerce by
13.

Id. at 632, 635.

14.

See Members of Supreme Court, supra note 1.

15.

551 U.S. 701 (2007).

16.

Id. at 735.

17.

133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).

18.

Id. at 2415–16. Justice Kennedy did note that race could not be
considered “[i]f ‘a nonracial approach . . . could promote the substantial
interest about as well and at tolerable administrative expense.’” Id. at
2420 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6
(1986) (plurality opinion)).

19.

See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business
Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 1431, 1472 (2013) (“[T]he
Roberts Court is much friendlier to business than either the Burger or
Rehnquist Courts . . . . The Court is taking more cases in which the
business litigant lost in the lower court and reversing more of these—
giving rise to the paradox that a decision in which certiorari is granted
when the lower court decision was anti-business is more likely to be
reversed than one in which the lower court decision was pro-business.”).

20.

554 U.S. 570 (2008).

21.

132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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the national government, thereby possibly limiting the power of
Congress to define what affects commerce for purposes of regulation.22
Most significantly, as we will discuss in Part II of this Article, in
United States v. Windsor23 the Court not only refuses to backtrack on
the expansion of homosexuals’ rights under the Due Process Clause in
Lawrence24 and under the Equal Protection Clause in Romer;25 but it
also chooses to expand homosexuals’ rights under the Constitution26
by declaring the nation’s Defense of Marriage Act27 (DOMA)
unconstitutional, because it violates basic due process and equal
protection principles by “impos[ing] a disadvantage, a separate status,
and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made
lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.”28
Moreover, the analysis presented below explains why the Supreme
Court has let stand federal circuit court decisions that found
unconstitutional state bans on same-sex marriage. It did so even
though Windsor found only that it was unconstitutional for the
national government to fail to recognize same-sex marriage rights that
were established by states.
Thus, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed and expanded implied
fundamental rights and equal protection under the law during a
period of political dominance by social conservatives, evangelical
Christians, and other groups who largely view the protection of their

22.

Id. at 2590. For a discussion of the doctrinal implications of the nascent
right to liberty under the Commerce Clause in the NFIB case, see
Ronald Kahn, The Commerce Clause and Executive Power: Exploring
Nascent Individual Rights in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius, 73 Md. L. Rev. 133 (2013). See infra notes 76–77
and accompanying text.

23.

133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).

24.

Id. at 2694; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).

25.

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).

26.

Cf. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2697 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The
majority emphasizes that DOMA was a ‘system wide enactment with no
identified connection to any particular area of federal law,’ but a State’s
definition of marriage ‘is the foundation of the State’s broader authority
to regulate the subject of domestic relations with respect to the
[p]rotection of offspring, property interests, and the enforcement of
marital responsibilities.’ And the federal decision undermined (in the
majority’s view) the ‘dignity [already] conferred by the States in the
exercise of their sovereign power,’ whereas a State’s decision whether to
expand the definition of marriage from its traditional contours involves
no similar concern.” (internal citations omitted)).

27.

1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated by Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675.

28.

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (majority opinion).
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definition of family values as a central mission of government.29 As I
noted in a previous publication, “social conservatives hoped that
Republican appointees to the Supreme Court would roll back abortion
rights, gay rights, affirmative action policies, and the constitutional
separation of church and state.”30 I argued, however, that the
Supreme Court has surprisingly (or unsurprisingly) sustained doctrine
in opposition to the core values comprising the base of the Republican
Party or expanded rights in these doctrinal areas.31
We need to explain why the Court expanded gay rights in the
Windsor decision, rather than simply describe what the Court said. In
order to explain why a conservative-moderate Supreme Court has
expanded implied fundamental rights for homosexuals, first in
Lawrence and now Windsor, one must explore the nature of Supreme
Court decision making and focus in particular on how Supreme Court
decision making relates to the social, economic, and political factors
outside the Court: to see whether the Court, in its decision making,
relates principles in cases to its view of the lived lives of individuals.
Such an analysis will also help explain why most social scientists and
many legal experts in constitutional law have failed to explain (or
predict) the expansion of privacy rights and other individual
liberties.32

29.

See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, Essay, “Multiply and Replenish”:
Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of State Interests in Marital
Procreation, 24 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 771, 799 (2001)
(“Culturally, the legalization of same-sex marriage would send a
message that would undermine the social boundaries relating to
marriage and family relations. The confusion of social roles linked with
marriage and parenting would be tremendous, and the message of
‘anything goes’ in the way of sexual behavior, procreation, and
parenthood would wreak its greatest havoc among groups of vulnerable
individuals who most need the encouragement of bright line laws and
clear social mores concerning procreative responsibility.”).

30.

Kahn, supra note 2, at 174.

31.

See id. at 185 (“[Principled bi-directional decision making] causes the
Supreme Court to be simultaneously empirical and normative and
inward and outward looking in its decision making. It results in the
mutual construction of the internal and external through a process I will
call the ‘interpretive turn.’).

32.

See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy,
Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 Sup. Ct. Rev. 27, 27 (“My
principal suggestion here is that the Court’s remarkable decision in
Lawrence v. Texas is best seen as a successor to Griswold v.
Connecticut: judicial invalidation of a law that had become hopelessly
out of touch with existing social convictions. So understood, Lawrence,
like Griswold, reflects a distinctly American variation of the old English
idea of desuetude.” (footnotes omitted)).
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In this Article, I seek to explain the Windsor case and understand
the importance of the contributions of fellow participants to this
Symposium. To do so, I first present two primary models through
which scholars seek to explain Court decisions and comment on them.
“Scholars who rely on Model 1 . . . seek to explain Court decision
making in unidirectional terms, either internally from text or
precedent, or externally”—that is, directly “from the social, economic,
and political realities of the world outside,”33 or directly from other
factors, such as justices’ attitudes toward public policy before they
reach the Court. Model 2 says that Court decision making and
doctrinal change is “a bidirectional relationship between [1] legal
principles and precedents and [2] the social, economic, and political
climate outside the Court.”34
To clarify, Model 1 explains Supreme Court decision making,
either (1) from the historical, political, or social facts and events
outside the Court, or (2) from text, statute, or precedent. Model 2
explains Supreme Court decision making in bidirectional terms, as a
mutual construction process between text, precedent, and principles
coupled with the social, political, and historical realities of the lived
lives of persons.35
After Part I discusses Model 1 and Model 2 in more detail, Part II
of the Article analyzes Windsor by viewing the Supreme Court as
engaging in a bidirectional decision making process. In doing so, I first
look at what polity and rights principles are raised in the case, and
how they are applied through what I call a social construction
process, which I argue has been a part of the Court since its

33.

Kahn, supra note 22, at 140 (emphasis added).

34.

Id. at 140–41 (emphasis added); see also Ronald Kahn, Originalism, the
Living Constitution, and Supreme Court Decision Making in the
Twenty-First Century: Explaining Lawrence v. Texas, 67 Md. L. Rev.
25, 35 (2007) (“[B]i-directionality between the internal Court and the
world outside occurs at several levels, at the level of the lived lives of
citizens as the Court makes decisions about rights of privacy and
personhood as we see in the SCP [social construction process], and at
the level of politics itself.”). This Article will center on the use of both
Models to explain doctrinal change on the Supreme Court. Nevertheless,
these models may also be applied to decision making and doctrinal
change in lesser federal and state courts.

35.

Kahn, supra note 22, at 141. These two models are distinguishable in
other respects as well. For example, political scientists applying Model 1
use quantitative methods and those applying Model 2 use interpretive
methods to study the Supreme Court and doctrinal change. Further, both
models adopt conflicting assumptions about the importance of Court
institutional norms and process on the preference formation of Justices.
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establishment.36 I ask whether both liberal and conservative justices
employ arguments that are based on a bidirectionality between
principles and the lived lives of individuals. I also ask whether the
polity and rights principles articulated in Windsor, and their
application, make sense in light of the principles and social
constructions in prior cases involving the rights of privacy and
personhood.
In Part III, I explore the contributions of fellow Symposium
participants to see whether they analyze Windsor by employing
unidirectional or bidirectional methods of analysis. I also explore the
implications of their choices on their ability to explain why the Court
expanded gay rights in these same-sex marriage cases. In doing so, we
see the continued impact of the “formalist-realist divide” on our
discussion of the development of American constitutional law and the
role of the Supreme Court in that process.

I.

Unidirectional and Bidirectional Models
of Court Decision Making
A.

Background: The Formalist-Realist Divide

To understand the reason for the Models—why Model 1
dominates the analysis of Supreme Court decision making, especially
among most social scientists, and why Model 2 is superior in
explaining Court action and doctrinal change—we need to explore the
nature of this divide, whether the divide between formalism and
realism was ever valid historically as justices made decisions, and
whether it remained valid when Windsor was decided.37 I also note
that many other scholars of the Court and of common law reject the
formalist-realist divide, and thus by rejecting it, also reject the
possibility of Model 1 unidirectional explanations of Court action and
doctrinal change.38
36.

Ronald Kahn, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Theory:
1953–1993 (1994).

37.

Brian Tamanaha, at least, suggests that the divide is a “stranglehold. It
consists of a web of interlocking misinterpretations and confusions
bundled in a mutually reinforcing package that is now virtually taken
for granted. The consequences of this collection of errors are ongoing
and pernicious.” Brian Z. Tamanaha, Beyond the FormalistRealist Divide: The Role of Politics in Judging 3 (2010).

38.

See generally, e.g., Douglas E. Edlin, Judges And Unjust Laws:
Common Law Constitutionalism and the Foundations of
Judicial Review 47–48 (4th ed. 2011) (discussing how common law
tradition gives judges the dual mandate of applying law and developing
law); James R. Stoner, Jr., Common-Law Liberty: Rethinking
American Constitutionalism 165–67 (2003) (arguing that common
law is key to unlocking fundamental principles of the U.S. Constitution
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The divide consists of the view that the 1870s through the l920s
should be viewed as the heyday of legal formalism,39 a doctrine that
asserts, “the law is an internally consistent and logical body of rules
that is independent from the variable forms of its surrounding social
institutions.”40 While operating within the legal formalism framework,
“[f]ormalist judges . . . assumed that law was objective, unchanging,
extrinsic to the social climate, and, above all, different from and
superior to politics.”41 The formalist vision as described by legal
realists, however, included the following premises: “(1) the law is
rationally determinate, and (2) judging is [deductive in a] mechanical
[way]. . . . (3) legal reasoning is autonomous, since the class of legal
reasons suffices to justify a unique outcome [and] no recourse to nonlegal reasons [is] demanded or required”;42 (4) the process is “formal in
that right answers [can] be derived from [an] autonomous, logical
working out of the system”; and (5) legal thought is “conceptually
ordered in that ground-level rules [can] all be derived from a few
fundamental principles.”43
The other side of the divide narrative places an emphasis on legal
realist conceptions of judging and the study of courts, which are
viewed as counter to conceptions of judicial formalism.44 During the
1920s and 1930s, legal realists were charged with discrediting legal
formalism; this is due in part to the insights of Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Roscoe Pound, and Benjamin Cardozo.45 As Professor Brian
Tamanaha writes:
[T]he legal realists discredited legal formalism, demonstrating
that the law is filled with gaps and contradictions, that the law
and is a guide for judges deciding contemporary constitutional matters);
see also David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation,
63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877 (1996) (providing a common law constitutional
theory for a modern-day bidirectional interpretation of Court decision
making).
39.

Tamanaha, supra note 37, at 1.

40.

Mathieu Deflem, Sociology Of Law: Visions Of a Scholarly
Tradition 98 (2008).

41.

William M. Wiecek, Liberty under Law: The Supreme Court in
American Life 187 (1988).

42.

Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 Colum. L. Rev.
1138, 1145–46 (1999) (book review); see Tamanaha, supra note 37, at
160.

43.

Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 607, 608–
09 (1999); see Tamanaha, supra note 37, at 160.

44.

Tamanaha, supra note 37, at 1.

45.

Id.
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is indeterminate, that there are exceptions for almost every legal
rule or principle, and that legal principles and precedents can
support different results. The realists argued that judges decide
according to their personal preferences and then construct the
legal analysis to justify the desired outcome.46

For the realists, legal formalism, principles, and precedents—that is,
the law and legal method—do not explain what justices and judges
do.47 For the realist narrative, one must look outside the law and legal
process, into the ideologies of justices and the social, economic, and
political world outside the Court, to explain what courts do. The law
and legal process is indeterminate, not bounded in a disciplined way,
and clearly cannot be explained by the Court applying principles and
precedents.
B.

Model 1: Unidirectional Models for Explaining
What Court Does, or Should Do

Whether scholars reject or accept the divide results in two quite
different models for explaining Court decision making. Scholars who
accept the divide engage in “unidirectional” models (Model 1) for
explaining Court action. Scholars who reject the divide engage in
“bidirectional” models (Model 2) of Court decision making.48
Political scientists who employ attitudinal,49 regime,50 interest
group,51 and other approaches52 to Supreme Court decision making
46.

Id.

47.

Id. at 84.

48.

See infra Part I.C.

49.

This approach emphasizes that judges “vote” instrumentally in
constitutional (and other) cases in a way that is consistent with their
preexisting political “attitudes.” See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J.
Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model
Revisited (2002).

50.

Led by Robert A. Dahl, it emphasized that the Supreme Court follows
elections returns and the policies of the regime in power. See Robert A.
Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: the Supreme Court as a
National Policy Maker, 6 J. Pub. L. 279, 284–86 (1957). The Supreme
Court is viewed as a policy-making institution that is not very different
from those with elected officials in the executive and legislative branches
of government. Id. at 294–95.

51.

Studies of the dynamics of agenda setting and interest-group litigation—
that is, legal mobilization occurring prior to Supreme Court actions—
emphasize the instrumentalism of lawyers, social change groups, and
other actors as precursors to a consideration of the instrumentalism of
judges. See Lee Epstein & Joseph F. Kobylka, The Supreme
Court and Legal Change: Abortion and the Death Penalty 2432 (1992) (outlining the goals and strategies of interest group litigators);
H.W. Perry, Jr., Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the
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employ unidirectional explanations of Court action. All the factors by
which they seek to explain Court decisions are external to the Court
decision process. This has had enormous implications for how we
study the Supreme Court and explain doctrinal change, and thus how
we explain the development of individual rights.
The legalist strand of Model 1 unidirectional explanations of
Court decision making assumes that judging can be explained as the
application of principles and precedents in a formalistic way, without
looking into the outside world of the lived lives of persons. Under this
version of Model 1, it is assumed that doctrinal change comes from a
completely internal process, and the objective for legalist scholars is to
influence this process, or train lawyers to do so, through their
scholarship. Thus, constitutional scholars who argue for their version
of originalism, what the text means, and even for their vision of what
the Constitution should mean—whatever that is—are unidirectional
in their goals, whether or not such unidirectionality is possible
or not.53
Thus, constitutional theories that argue that the Constitution
should be interpreted based on a particular theory of rights or polity
principles will also be considered unidirectional, even when that
theory makes the argument that the Supreme Court is only one of
many important venues for making constitutional choices, and
perhaps not the best one at that—as Mark Tushnet does in his
argument for “taking the Constitution away from the courts.”54 The
reason for this is that, like originalists or Dahlian political scientists,
United States Supreme Court 245–68 (1991) (describing the criteria
for certiorari which can include cases that “are of huge political and
societal importance” or that involve a justice’s area of interest).
52.

We also see Model 1 unidirectional premises in scholars who view the
Court following or responding to historical events, such as the
Depression, the Cold War, or activities of social movements prior to
Court action. See Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race
and the Image of American Democracy 99–107 (William Chafe et
al. eds., 2000) (explaining how American desire to win the Cold War
spurred Supreme Court intervention in the school desegregation cases).

53.

See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism (2011) (an example of
Originalism and its unidirectionality); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law
Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts
in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A Matter of
Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 3, 23–25 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997) (distinguishing textualism from strict
constructionism, “a degraded form of textualism”).

54.

Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the
Courts ix (1999). More specifically, Tushnet argues for “populist
constitutional law,” which favors “the public generally [participating] in
shaping constitutional law more directly and openly.” Id. at 181–94.
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theories that are justificatory, no matter on what basis, are formalist,
while the Court is simultaneously formalist and realist in its decision
making. A theory that advocates a particular set of polity or rights
principles on which the Court should decide cases cannot explain
what the Court does—and therefore cannot be a model for how the
Court should act.
Unidirectional approaches used by legalists would include the
originalist approach, as well as when constitutional theorists argue for
one approach to what the Constitution means, such as Ronald
Dworkin’s moral theory,55 Barnett’s libertarian theory,56 and even
John Hart Ely’s theory that the Court should intercede into the
political system to help individuals and groups secure equal rights
when the political system cannot do so because of prejudice.57 Thus,
unidirectional approaches include how political scientists have
attempted to explain Court decisions as well as when constitutional
scholars have argued on what basis the Constitution should be
interpreted.
The unidirectionality that is central to many Model 1, social
science explanations of Court decision making is also found in
arguments that Court decision making results from justices
mechanically applying precedents, text, and constitutional principles
as they decide a case. Under this legalist strand of Model 1,
unidirectional Supreme Court decision making, it is presumed that all
well-trained justices would make the same decision, given the
appropriate precedents. This is the notion that justices are simply
mechanical in what they do in a closed system of legal decision
making.
As we have explored above, the formalist vision of law as
rationally determinate, judging as deductive in a mechanical way, and
legal reasoning as autonomous from society is not a valid description
of decision making by the Supreme Court. Right answers cannot be
derived from an autonomous, logical working of the system. Legal

55.

Ronald Dworkin’s moral reading of the Constitution “proposes that we
all—judges, lawyers, citizens—interpret and apply these abstract clauses
on the understanding that they invoke moral principles about political
decency and justice.” Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The
Moral Reading of the American Constitution 2 (1996).

56.

See Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The
Presumption of Liberty 259–69 (2004) (arguing for interpreting the
Constitution with a “presumption that in pursuing happiness persons
may do whatever is not justly prohibited” instead of a “presumption
that the government may do whatever is not expressly prohibited”).

57.

See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of
Judicial Review 135–79 (1980).
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thought is not conceptually ordered to the point that ground-level
rules could be derived from a few fundamental principles.
The history of Supreme Court decision making demonstrates that
unidirectional formalist models simply do not fit with what the Court
does in practice. Judges in the so-called formalist age knew the law
was indeterminate at times; knew that it involved notions of policy
considerations; and knew that principles had to be reconciled with
customs, norms, opinions in the community, and a popular sense of
rights and social interests in a changing world. In other words, all
lawyers and justices knew they made common law.
The most famous and influential theory of constitutional
interpretation that is characteristic of this internal-looking
unidirectional strand of Model 1 is originalism. However, while
advocates of originalism view their theory of how to interpret the
Constitution as formalist, and therefore not political, there are many
reasons to believe that there are realist elements external to the Court
in originalism. And it has been that way throughout the history of
the Court.58
Therefore, unidirectional Model 1 approaches for explaining Court
action or for advocating normative bases for its actions accept the
divide between formalism and realism, and in so doing are not based
on an understanding of what the Court has done throughout its
history—employing both formalist and realist elements. This will
become clearer as we explore below the key elements of Model 2
bidirectional approaches for explaining Court decision making, and
make an argument for such approaches.
Thus, legalist unidirectional models of the Court, whether based
only on formalism or skeptical realist explanations of Court action
from outside the Court, foster improper visions of what the Supreme
Court is doing. Tamanaha writes:
The story about formalism promotes the unrealistic image
of self-applying legal rules; skeptical realism promotes the
equally unrealistic opposite image of human judges pursuing
their personal preferences beneath a veneer of legal rules . . . If
58.

See Howard Gillman, The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and
the Rise of the Notion of the “Living Constitution” in the Course of
American State-Building, 11 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 191, 224–40 (1997),
for the view that the period prior to 1937 was the age of formalism,
textualism and originalism and the period after 1937 was the age of the
“Living Constitution.” This narrative is additional evidence of the
impact of the idea of a divide on scholarship and unidirectional methods
of Court analysis. The divide was rejected by the Court; id. at 238,
however, it was accepted by many legalists, political scientists and
historians. In doing so, we have a misguided view of both pre- and postLochner era judging.
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legal rules were perfectly preexistent and judges were calculating
machines, these situations [of difference in opinion among
justices, negotiation, and changes of opinion] would be
indications of flaws. But mechanical jurisprudence is impossible.
It is a mistake to think of these unavoidable aspects as flaws
rather than as inherent conditions of law and judging.59

The unidirectional realist narrative of what the Court does and why it
does it also is not borne out by an analysis of the history of Supreme
Court decision making, in part because formalist elements such as
principles and precedents, not simply realistic ones, are at the core of
Court decision making. In addition, realist assumptions that justices
make decisions on the basis of personal ideologies, policy wants, or the
beliefs of the presidents who appointed them also are not borne out
by the history of the Supreme Court. Realist assumptions that one
only has to look outside the Court for social, economic, or political
factors to explain Court action also are not valid when one studies the
history of the Supreme Court. Nor is the realist assumption that legal
arguments and the process through which the Court makes decisions
are simply justifications for decisions made on realist factors.
C.

Model 2: Court Decision Making as a Bidirectional,
Mutual Construction Process

Under Model 2, doctrinal change, including the development of
individual rights, is caused by a constitutive Supreme Court decision
making process that is bidirectional: the internal decision-making
process in which principles and precedents are applied in a case
interact with the social, economic, and political world outside the
Court, but not in the unidirectional way that is assumed in Model 1.
Moreover, explanations of Court action must also be explained in
bidirectional terms. Unlike Model 1, Model 2 scholars do not see the
outside world as one “X factor” causing Court decisions; nor do they
see internal values and norms as deciding cases in a closed system.
The objective of the scholar is to understand the factors internal to
the Court decision-making process and to see how the Court brings
the social, economic, and political world into its decision making.
Scholars who reject the divide employ Model 2 understandings of
Supreme Court decision making. They emphasize that, in order to
understand Court decision making, one must explore the mutual
construction of formalist and realist elements in Court decision
making. They stress that there is a bidirectional relationship between
the formalism of Court decision making (principles, precedents, and
doctrine) and the realism of the political, economic, and social world

59.

Tamanaha, supra note 37, at 195.
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outside the Court. Therefore, neither legal or formalist elements nor
realist elements alone can explain Court decisions.
Thus, bidirectionality occurs at two levels—at the level of the
relationship between formalist and realist elements in internal Court
decision making, and in terms of the importance of the realism
surrounding the social, economic, and political world outside
the Court.
Model 2, unlike Model 1, is based on the assumption that the
Court is in a bidirectional relationship with society as it makes
constitutional choices, as well as the assumption that Court decision
making is based, simultaneously, on the application of principles and
the effect of institutional norms and processes on the Court and
professional norms on lawyers and justices. Model 2 rejects the
behavioralist methodological assumptions of Model 1—that is, that
Court action can be explained by assuming that factors either internal
to the Court or external to the Court inform what the Court does.
Support for Model 2—viewing the Court as bidirectional in its
decision making—is based on the premise that it will provide a
superior basis by which to understand the relationship between
Supreme Court decision making and the development of individual
rights in specific cases, such as Windsor, as well as over time within
and among doctrinal areas.
Model 2 will help us explain why a conservative/moderate Court
in a conservative era extends progressive individual rights and
establishes new ones. Finally, the analysis of the development of
individual rights under the assumptions of Model 2 bidirectionality
will help us better understand the limits and possibilities of
contemporary normative constitutional theories as guides to past and
future Court actions.

II. United States v. Windsor: A Product of
Bidirectional Supreme Court Decision Making
Polity principles are important to all of the justices writing
opinions in Windsor. All justices accept the polity principle of
deference to states to decide who may marry.60 Justice Kennedy

60.

Justice Kennedy provided evidence of the traditional deference that the
federal government and the courts have given to states to define who
can marry by emphasizing the following: (1) the definition of marriage is
the foundation of the states’ broader authority to regulate the subject of
domestic relations—with respect to offspring, property interest, and
enforcement of marital responsibilities; (2) at the time of adoption of the
Constitution, states had full power over marriage and divorce; (3) the
Constitution did not delegate authority over marriage and divorce to
the federal government; and (4) federal courts defer to states on
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explores polity principles to decide whether there is a case or
controversy, and finds there is because of prudential principles in rules
of standing.61 The importance of polity principles is not limited to
deciding questions of standing; they are also central for the
consideration of whether DOMA is unconstitutional because it
violates rights and principles central to whether same-sex couples
have been denied equal protection and due process of law.62 Kennedy
uses the principle of deference to states as a basis for arguing that the
refusal of the national government to recognize state-defined rights to
same-sex marriage is an important factor in demonstrating why
DOMA denies equal protection and due process rights to same-sex
families.63
The dissenters would have liked the Court to either not grant
certiorari or to take the case and then say there was no case or
controversy for various reasons.64 Or the dissenters would have liked
the Court to say that the polity principle of deference to state
decisions on who may marry was not violated in Windsor by the
national government’s refusal to recognize the right to marry for
same-sex couples.65
regulation of marriage and divorce even in diversity of citizenship cases.
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691–92 (2013).
61.

See id. at 2687–88 (holding that there was a sufficiently adversarial
process because a group from Congress (BLAG) was permitted to argue
for DOMA’s constitutionality).

62.

See id. at 2689 (“Against this background of lawful same-sex
marriage in some States, the design, purpose, and effect of DOMA
should be considered as the beginning point in deciding whether it is
valid under the Constitution.”).

63.

See id. at 2692 (“When the State used its historic and essential
authority to define the marital relation in this way, its role and its
power in making the decision enhanced the recognition, dignity, and
protection of the class in their own community. DOMA, because of its
reach and extent, departs from this history and tradition of reliance on
state law to define marriage. ‘[D]iscriminations of an unusual character
especially suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are
obnoxious to the constitutional provision.’” (quoting Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996))).

64.

See id. at 2698 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“But wait, the reader wonders—
Windsor won below, and so cured her injury, and the President was
glad to see it. True, says the majority, but judicial review must march
on regardless, lest we ‘undermine the clear dictate of the separation-ofpowers principle that when an Act of Congress is alleged to conflict with
the Constitution, it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.’” (quoting id. at 2688 (majority
opinion)).

65.

See id. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The majority sees a more
sinister motive, pointing out that the Federal Government has
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Justices Scalia, Roberts, and Alito explore polity principles both
within standing rules and within their views of how to interpret the
Constitution. Because there is no right to same-sex marriage in the
Constitution, and because same-sex marriage is only now recently
within the history and tradition of our nation, democratic institutions,
not courts, should decide whether same-sex couples should have the
right to marry.66 The dissenters’ reading of the Constitution and the
history and tradition of marriage laws result in a finding that the
federal government did not act unconstitutionally when it passed
DOMA. For the dissenters, looking ahead to later cases, these same
factors and their analysis of equal protection and due process
principles in Romer and Lawrence suggest that states should not be
required to offer same-sex couples the right to marry.67
What is so interesting in Windsor is Justice Scalia’s analysis of
the application of rights principles in Justice Kennedy’s decision—
specifically Scalia’s assertion that Kennedy’s analysis may lead to a
constitutional right to same-sex marriage and his skepticism of Justice
Kennedy’s disclaimer that Windsor will not do so.68 It demonstrates
that Justice Scalia understands the implications of the rights
principles set out in Justice Kennedy’s opinion—and how the rights to
liberty and equal protection first enunciated in Lawrence and Romer,
generally (though not uniformly) deferred to state definitions of
marriage in the past. That is true, of course, but none of those prior
state-by-state variations had involved differences over something—as
the majority puts it—‘thought of by most people as essential to the
very definition of [marriage] and to its role and function throughout
the history of civilization.’” (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 2689
(majority opinion))).
66.

See id. at 2697–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This case . . . is about the
power of our people to govern themselves, and the power of this Court
to pronounce the law. Today’s opinion aggrandizes the latter, with the
predictable consequence of diminishing the former. We have no power to
decide this case. And even if we did, we have no power under the
Constitution to invalidate this democratically adopted legislation.”).

67.

See id. at 2697 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[W]hile ‘[t]he State’s power
in defining the marital relation is of central relevance’ to the majority’s
decision to strike down DOMA here, that power will come into play on
the other side of the board in future cases about the constitutionality of
state marriage definitions. So too will the concerns for state diversity
and sovereignty that weigh against DOMA’s constitutionality in this
case.” (quoting id. at 2692 (majority opinion))).

68.

See id. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The penultimate sentence of the
majority’s opinion is a naked declaration that ‘[t]his opinion and its
holding are confined’ to those couples ‘joined in same-sex marriages
made lawful by the State.’ I have heard such ‘bald, unreasoned
disclaimer[s]’ before.” (quoting id. at 2696, 2695; Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 604 (2003))).
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respectively, have been applied in Windsor.69 He also understands
that the social construction of sexual intimacy as central to enduring
personal relations informs whether same-sex couples should have a
right to marry.70 It is also significant that Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito dislike what Justice Scalia does—I suspect for strategic
reasons—as it undermines their argument that DOMA is
constitutional on the basis of their application of polity principles.71
Justices Kennedy and Scalia agree that there is a polity principle
throughout our nation’s history: we have deferred to states to define
who can marry. They differ on whether only polity principles are
involved in this case, because of differences over whether gay men and
lesbians have any liberty rights. This debate is bounded by prior
debates about polity and rights principles in Romer and Lawrence,
and can only be understood in those terms.72 Moreover, the social
construction of what rights of liberty are violated by DOMA builds on
rights defined in prior cases, and the social construction of those
rights, through a process of analogy.
It is quite clear that Justice Kennedy rejects the divide between
formalism and realism.73 Throughout the majority decision, questions
as to whether DOMA violates equal protection and due process
principles are explored through looking at the reality of the lived lives
69.

See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It takes real cheek for today’s majority
to assure us, as it is going out the door, that a constitutional
requirement to give formal recognition to same-sex marriage is not at
issue here—when what has preceded that assurance is a lecture on how
superior the majority’s moral judgment in favor of same-sex marriage is
to the Congress’s hateful moral judgment against it.”).

70.

See id. 2708–09 (“In the majority’s judgment, any resistance to its
holding is beyond the pale of reasoned disagreement. To question its
high-handed invalidation of a presumptively valid statute is to
act . . . with the purpose to ‘disparage,’ ‘injure,’ ‘degrade,’ ‘demean,’
and ‘humiliate’ our fellow human beings, our fellow citizens, who are
homesexual.”).

71.

See id. at 2696–97 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Justice SCALIA believes
this is a ‘bald, unreasoned disclaime[r].’ In my view, though, the
disclaimer is a logical and necessary consequence of the argument the
majority has chosen to adopt.” (quoting id. at 2709 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting))); id. at 2714 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The Constitution does
not guarantee the right to enter into a same-sex marriage. Indeed, no
provision of the Constitution speaks to the issue.”).

72.

See id. at 2693–96 (majority opinion) (considering the equal protection
principles established in Romer, then showing the relationship between
those equal protection principles and the due process liberty principles
in Lawrence).

73.

See generally Tamanaha, supra note 37, at 1–3 (discussing the divide
between formalist and realist).

1312

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 3·2014
Understanding United States v. Windsor and the Symposium Contributions
Using Unilateral and Bilateral Models of Supreme Court Decision Making

of same-sex couples.74 Justice Kennedy is always looking outside the
walls of the Constitution to see whether the rights of same-sex couples
and their families are violated. In doing so, he also looks outside the
walls of formalist principles to view the place marriage has in the lives
of opposite-sex couples. But the degree to which justices look at the
reality of the world outside the Court depends on how they interpret
rights and polity principles, as we saw the dissenters refusing to
accept the social constructions of Justice Kennedy because they
rejected his view of rights principles in Romer and Lawrence.75
But the dissenters in Windsor did not always oppose the
construction process to see whether rights have been violated. We see
below a mutual construction process between formalism and realism
when Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Alito, Chief Justice Roberts,
Justice Thomas, and Justice Kennedy, argue for a right to liberty
under the Commerce Clause as a basis to find the Affordable Care
Act unconstitutional. At the core of Justice Scalia’s opinion in
Sebelius is the proposition that the national government cannot force
persons into interstate commerce.76 This right to liberty is based on
an economic construction: refusing to buy health insurance is not
action, but inaction,77 in contrast to the analysis of Justice Ginsburg,
in which choosing not to buy health insurance is action, and one that
can be regulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause.78
74.

See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694 (“The differentiation demeans the
couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution protects, and
whose relationship the State has sought to dignify. And it humiliates
tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples. The
law in question makes it even more difficult for the children to
understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its
concord with other families in their community and in their daily
lives.”) (citation omitted).

75.

See id. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“As I have observed before, the
Constitution does not forbid the government to enforce traditional
moral and sexual norms. I will not swell the U. S. Reports with
restatements of that point.” (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).

76.

Nat’l. Fed’n. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2647–50 (2012)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).

77.

See id. at 2649 (“But it must be activity affecting commerce that is
regulated, and not merely the failure to engage in commerce. And one is
not now purchasing the health care covered by the insurance mandate
simply because one is likely to be purchasing it in the future. Our test's
premise of regulated activity is not invented out of whole cloth, but
rests upon the Constitution's requirement that it be commerce which is
regulated. If all inactivity affecting commerce is commerce, commerce is
everything.”).

78.

Id. at 2617 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
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Comparing Sebelius and Windsor suggests that both originalists
and non-originalists apply polity and rights principles through a
process of social and/or economic construction, which brings the
realism of the world outside the Court into the Court’s decisionmaking process. And they do so by comparing polity and rights
principles, and social/economic constructions and prior cases, as they
define new polity and rights principles and social/economic
constructions in the case before the Court. There is a mutual
construction of the formalist polity and rights principles and the
realism of the world outside the Court. Yet this is not new, since
Court decision making has been one of “balanced realism” throughout
the history of our nation.79

III. Unidirectional and Bidirectional Methods of
Analysis in Symposium Contributions
Because of the range and complexity of these important
contributions to legal scholarship and the understanding of The
Marriage Cases, I have written a set of questions that I will apply to
each of the articles to see whether they are built on Model 1 or Model
2 conceptions of Supreme Court decision making. I understand that
some articles discuss the policy implications of the marriage cases. For
example, the wonderful contribution of Nancy C. Marcus speaks to
the doctrinal impact of Windsor and the institutional questions that
impact the strategies used by the LGBT advocacy groups in bringing
gay rights cases to court.80 However, to make this manageable, I am
organizing the articles into groups that are discussions primarily of
the Doctrinal (Maggie Gallagher and William C. Duncan,81 Sherif
Girgis,82 Andrew Koppelman,83 Nancy C. Marcus,84 and Ernest A.
79.

As Professor Tamanaha explains, “‘balanced realism’ has two integrally
conjoined aspects—a skeptical aspect and a rule-bound aspect. . . . The
rule-bound aspect of judging can function reliably notwithstanding the
challenges presented by the skepticism-inducing aspect.” Tamanaha,
supra note 37, at 6.

80.

Nancy C. Marcus, When Quacking Like a Duck is Really a Swan Song
in Disguise: How Windsor’s State Powers Analysis Sets the Stage for the
Demise of Federalism-Based Marriage Discrimination, 64 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 1073, 1079–97 (2014).

81.

Maggie Gallagher & William C. Duncan, The Kennedy Doctrine: Moral
Disagreement and the “Bare Desire to Harm,” 64 Case W. Res. L.
Rev. 949 (2014).

82.

Sherif Girgis, Windsor: Lochnerizing on Marriage?, 64 Case W. Res.
L. Rev. 971 (2014).

83.

Andrew Koppelman, Beyond Levels of Scrutiny: Windsor and “Bare
Desire to Harm,” 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1045 (2014).
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Young85), the Institutional (Susan J. Becker,86 Robert F. Nagel,87
Nancy Scherer,88 and Robin Fretwell Wilson89), and the Policy (Helen
M. Alvaré90 and Frances Goldscheider91) implications of the marriage
cases.
In doing so, I realize that I cannot get into the complex thought
processes and motives in the writing of each of these articles, although
a good number of contributors speak to their motives and objectives
for writing their articles. So when I use the term that a contributor
assumes something, it is based on the scholarly assumptions that I
identify in his or her articles.
A.

Doctrinal Analyses

1.

Nancy C. Marcus

“When Quacking Like a Duck Is Really a Swan Song in Disguise:
How Windsor’s State Powers Analysis Sets the Stage for the
Demise of Federalism-Based Marriage Discrimination”

Although based on Model 1 assumptions about decision making,
Marcus rejects the formalist-realist divide. She rejects a simple insideout or outside-in explanation for Court decisions, and while she does
not explore the direction of change at the level of the mutual
construction of formalism and realism, Marcus does examine the role
of legal advocacy group politics on Court decisions. She offers an
important analysis of conflicts within the LGBT advocacy community
as to what strategy to follow, whether one based on polity or rights
principles or on minimalist or maximalist rights arguments.92
84.

Marcus, supra note 80.

85.

Ernest A. Young, Is There a Federal Definitions Power?, 64 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 1269 (2014).

86.

Susan J. Becker, The Role of Judicial Independence in the Continuing
Quest for LGBT Equality, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 863 (2014).

87.

Robert F. Nagel, Same-sex Marriage, Federalism,
Supremacy, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1119 (2014).

88.

Nancy Scherer, Viewing the Supreme Court’s Marriage Cases Through
the Lens of Political Science, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1131 (2014).

89.

Robin Fretwell Wilson, Marriage of Necessity: Same-Sex Marriage and
Religious Liberty Protections, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1161 (2014).

90.

Helen M. Alvaré, Same-Sex Marriage and the “Reconceiving of
Children,” 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 829 (2014).

91.

Frances Goldscheider, Rescuing the Family from the Homophobes and
Anitfeminists: Analyzing the Recently Developed and Already Eroding
“Traditional” Notions of Family and Gender, 64 Case W. Res. L.
Rev. 1029 (2014).

92.

Marcus, supra note 80, at 1079–97.
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However, in the end, the LGBT community chose litigation strategies
that were not as aggressive in terms of rights demanded as what the
Court delivered in Windsor.93 In institutional terms, Marcus must
admit that the Court is quite autonomous from the influence of legal
advocacy groups, because the choice of what polity and rights
principles to emphasize is up to the Court, and one could not predict
what the Court would do in Windsor.
In doing so, Marcus is admitting that preference formation on the
Court occurs and is not predictable. She also is admitting that polity
and rights principles inform Court decision making,94 but it is not
easy to predict how polity and rights principles will be chosen and
how they relate to each other. It is quite clear that, given the choices
that the Court has, Marcus is not taking an originalist view of how
the Constitution should be interpreted, in part because she admits
Court choices are based on a look at preceding cases.
It is quite clear that Marcus likes the policy implications of the
rights defined in Windsor, and the Court’s rejection of basing the
decision on the polity principle of deference to states in deciding who
can marry.95 However, this is not Model 2 analysis because there is no
discussion of the mutual construction of the polity and rights
principles or of the formalist and realist elements in Court decision
making. Nor is there a discussion of the implications of choosing a
specific reading of equal protection or due process rights principles, in
light of the realism of the world outside the Court.
We see this in the fact that Marcus’ Duck Test is not about the
relationship of formalist and realist elements in Court decision
making, the comparison of social constructions in precedents with
those in the case before the Court, or other elements of Model 2
decision making. It is that the Duck is no longer quacking only
federalist polity principles, and that rights principles, as Marcus
argues, will lead to a right to same-sex marriage.96

93.

Id. at 1096–97.

94.

See id. at 1110 (“Windsor ultimately stands for the limitation on both
federal and state legislative power to engage in class-based unequal
deprivation of substantive due process rights, including the right of
same-sex married couples to receive equal respect for their marriages.”).

95.

See id. at 1096 (“By basing its finding of unconstitutionality on Fifth
Amendment due process and equal protection grounds rather than
Tenth Amendment federalism grounds, the Windsor Court ‘dodged a
bullet.’” (quoting Courtney G. Joslin, Windsor, Federalism, and Family
Equality, 113 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 156, 158 (2013), http://www.colu
mbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Joslin-113-Colum.-L.Rev.-Sidebar-156.pdf)).

96.

Id. at 1112–17.
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While no article can discuss all that has to be discussed with
regard to the marriage cases, Marcus does demonstrate why Windsor
is based ultimately on rights principles. Clearly, Marcus does more
than simply support or oppose the Windsor decision. Rather, the
argument is made why Windsor will most likely lead to a
constitutional right to marriage, in part because the Court did not
base its decision on polity principles alone, nor on narrow rights
principles as requested by LGBT legal advocacy groups.97
In doing so, Marcus is demonstrating that the law is bounded, but
not determinant. It is the result of a robust process of legal advocacy
and a Court that can make choices to inform changing individual
rights.
At times, Marcus seems to accept the Model 1 premise that Court
decision making can be explained as a result of unidirectional factors
outside the Court when she notes that the change from federalism to
rights-based arguments may be seen as the Court following public
opinion as demonstrated by polling.98
Marcus also argues that the “inclusion of federalism overtones in
the majority opinion is strategic artifice that deliberately masks the
decision’s broader purpose of using federalism against itself—i.e.,
engaging federalism-sounding principles only to ultimately dismantle
federalism-based marriage discrimination.”99 One could argue that
here Marcus is rejecting the validity of Model 2 Court decision
making, because she does not see that the Court’s decision making
and its final opinions are the result of a process of preference
formation, in which the mutual construction processes, the
consideration of precedents, and the definition of the relationship
between polity and rights principles are real, and not simply strategic
moves by the Court.
Part of the article is a discussion of the Court’s application of
formalist polity and rights principles100; the other part is an important
discussion of the realism of the external advocacy process in which
lawyers must decide whether to make arguments against DOMA
based on polity and rights principles and whether to be minimalist or
maximalist in the application of these principles.101 The importance of
scholarly analysis on litigation strategies is demonstrated by LGBT
advocacy groups’ acceptance of Cass Sunstein’s argument for

97.

Id.

98.

Marcus, supra note 80, at 1080–82.

99.

Id. at 1078.

100. Id. at 1105.
101. Id. at 1082–83.
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minimalism102 and Gerald Rosenberg’s argument from The Hollow
Hope as to why the groups should fear a political backlash if they
choose to be maximalist in seeking individual rights for gay men
and lesbians.103
2.

Sherif Girgis

“Windsor: Lochnerizing on Marriage?”

In support of Justice Alito’s dissent, Girgis argues that the Court
decided between two reasonably disputed views about marriage. One
is consent-based, that marriage is to “promote any romantic pairbond,” and the other is based on conjugality, that marriage is to
promote “a comprehensive . . . union . . . intrinsically ordered to
producing new life” and thus is “intrinsically opposite-sex.”104
Because the Constitution is entirely silent on what marriage is
and what branch of government should decide who can marry, and
the Equal Protection Clause is not applicable to a right to marry, the
Constitution cannot inform what the social stakes of marriage are to
individuals or to the nation. The decision as to whether there is a
right to marry should be left up to politics. Therefore, Windsor’s
finding that DOMA is unconstitutional and that it violates the
Constitution for the federal government or the states to ban same-sex
marriage was inappropriate for the Court to do.105 In fact, to do so is
just as illegitimate as the Court establishing a right to liberty that
keeps the government from interfering with the freedom to bargain
between employer and employee by limiting the working hours of
bakers,106 as in Lochner v. New York.107
Therefore, Windsor is “Lochnerized.” The Court substituted its
own policy judgments of a consent-based view of marriage for the
constitutionally-legitimate and electorally-favored alternatives, a
conjugal view of marriage.108 Thus, Girgis goes beyond Justice Alito’s
dissent.
102. See Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J.
1, 25–26 (1994) (arguing for incremental change).
103. See Marcus, supra note 80, at 1082–84; see also Gerald N.
Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change? 355–429 (2d ed. 2008).
104. Girgis, supra note 82, at 974 (quoting United States v. Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. 2675, 2718 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
105. Id. at 991–95.
106. Id. at 995–97.
107. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
108. Girgis, supra note 82, at 973–74.
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For Girgis, any ruling against DOMA or any state or national law
that chooses (on equal protection grounds) between two reasonably
disputed, “extra-constitutional value and policy judgments,” as to
which definition of marriage is best for individuals and the nation, is
Lochnerizing, and not based on a proper reading of the
Constitution.109
Girgis argues for the power of government to favor traditional
marriage in two ways. The “Value Judgment Defense” of marriage
gives marriage a distinct moral value as it “unites the whole of the
partners: not just in heart and mind, but also bodily.”110 The “General
Welfare Defense” of traditional marriage as conjugal-based is that
traditional marriage is socially valuable for society because it benefits
children—a purpose better served, frankly, by recognizing oppositesex and same-sex bonds.111
In the Girgis article, we see a rejection of the Model 2 decisionmaking process of the Windsor Court. Girgis’ elaborate, but flawed,
analysis in opposition to the Windsor decision, and any Court
decision favoring a right to same-sex marriage, has all the problems of
an originalist interpretation of the Constitution because of its
rejection of Model 2 Court decision making.112
Ironically, Girgis is willing to give his views on the realism of
what happens in opposite-sex and same-sex marriages to adults and
children, but for the Supreme Court to do so violates an originalist
interpretation of the Constitution. We see this in his construction of
the ideal type of consent and conjugal-based conceptions of what
marriage is and his support of a conjugal-based view of marriage. We
see this in Girgis’ criticism of Koppelman’s equal protection argument
in support of Windsor.113 Girgis argues that reproduction has a clear

109. Id. at 997.
110. Id. at 991.
111. Id. at 992.
112. See id. at 1013–27 (arguing that using realism to strike down DOMA on
equal protection grounds because it would be the equivalent of
Lochnerizing).
113. In what he labels the “Depraved Heart” attempt to strike DOMA down
on equal protection grounds, id. at 1022, Girgis would not permit
Koppelman to use realist arguments:
All that DOMA did effectively was to “tell [same-sex]
couples . . . that their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of
federal recognition.” Its “purpose [wa]s to convey a message of
disdain for gay couples.” And because none of the purported
benefits was even nearly proportionate to its costs, DOMA
accomplished this purpose “with extreme indifference to the
human costs.”

1319

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 3·2014
Understanding United States v. Windsor and the Symposium Contributions
Using Unilateral and Bilateral Models of Supreme Court Decision Making

social value for individuals and the nation, one that is related to
marriage, unlike race and gender classification, which are pure
inventions of social custom.114
This is not the place to write a detailed criticism of Girgis’ view
of the reality of opposite-sex and same-sex marriages for adults and
children. This Symposium offers many informed articles with quite
different views of that reality. It is ironic that Girgis argues that
government should only recognize, legally, his reality of what
marriage should be at this time in our nation’s history. Today, fewer
heterosexual individuals are marrying but are having children,
resulting in more children in homes without married parents. Allowing
same-sex marriage does not disparage opposite-sex marriage—it
secures personal relations and encourages having children, both of
which are good for society.
For the reasons stated above, the Court has good reason to reject
the arguments of Girgis and the originalists about the right to
marriage. They are willing to impose their view of reality and
marriage on the Court, but do so by hiding behind the façade of an
originalist interpretation of the Constitution.115
The argument that any decision by the Court on the right to
marry is Lochnerizing is mistaken. The problem with Lochner was
that the right to liberty of contract was not really liberty; when one
socially constructs what the reality is between the employer and
employee when they bargain over wages and hours, one realizes that
they are not on equal footing, and the cost of this “liberty” is paid not
only by the employees and their families, but by the entire nation as
well.116 A right of due process liberty to marriage for same-sex couples
is no different than the liberty that opposite-sex couples get when
they are allowed to marry. The failure to see these differences— and
see that the Court can make such distinctions and overturn landmark
decisions when a right to liberty never has or no longer does relate to
the lived lives of persons—suggests the formulaic nature of the charge
that the Court in Windsor is Lochnerizing. To reject the fact that
principles and realism mutually construct each other, and the fact
that the Court looks outside the walls of the Constitution, as it
Id. at 1024 (quoting United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694
(2013); Andrew Koppelman, Why Scalia Should Have Voted to Overturn
DOMA, 108 N.W. L. REV. COLLOQUY 131, 151 (2013), http://
www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2013/12/LRColl2013n12K
oppelman.pdf).
114. See id. at 988–91.
115. See supra Part I.B.
116. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873, 880
(1987).
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always has done, is the most important indication of Girgis’ rejection
of Model 2 Court decision making.
Finally, why does Girgis emphasize the place of equal protection
and not due process liberty principles in his critique of the Windsor
decision and the right to same-sex marriage?117 The right to same-sex
marriage is stronger if one considers long-time precedents and Justice
Kennedy’s opinions in Lawrence and Windsor.118 It also is stronger if
one considers the relationship of marriage to enduring personal
relations between gay couples. The charge that the Court is
Lochnerizing in Windsor is an argument against the power of the
Court as an institution to decide what constitutes liberty under the
Due Process Clauses. It does not speak directly to the question of why
Kennedy is misguided in his analysis of why DOMA violates the
liberty of same-sex couples.
3.

Maggie Gallagher and William C. Duncan

“The Kennedy Doctrine: Moral Disagreement and the ‘Bare
Desire to Harm’”

The Gallagher and Duncan contribution is an argument against
what it calls the “Kennedy Doctrine,” as found in Justice Kennedy’s
decisions in Bond v. United States,119 Romer v. Evans, Lawrence v.
Texas, and United States v. Windsor.120 It appears more as a political
attack on those that support gay marriage rather than a deep analysis
of the doctrinal bases of these decisions or of the Court as an
institution.
In this article, we are told that conservatives are more respecting
of counter arguments on gay rights than liberals, because Justice
Kennedy and liberals assume any opposition to gay rights and
marriage constitutes a bare desire to harm, even by those with
sincere religious beliefs, and that “bare desire to harm” arguments
intensify political conflict.121 We see the Kennedy doctrine as part of
the “collapse of sexual norms and order,”122 brought on by the “new
liberal moral order,”123 led by the Supreme Court, that is part of this
new liberal elite.

117. Cf. Girgis, supra note 82, at 993 n.105.
118. See supra Part II.
119. 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011).
120. Gallagher & Duncan, supra note 81, at 949.
121. Id. at 960–66.
122. Id. at 964.
123. Id. at 968.
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At the doctrinal level, Justice Kennedy is criticized for not
recognizing that heightened Court scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause applies to only race and gender classifications in
law,124 for not respecting the history and tradition of our nation in
support of traditional marriage,125 for not respecting moral values that
support traditional marriage,126 and for the failure to see the difference
between what constitutes a liberty and equality interest under our
Constitution.127 In so doing, the Kennedy doctrine constitutes a
“constitutional ideology.”128
It is difficult to determine whether the authors support Model 1
or Model 2 Court decision making, because there is no analysis of the
relationship of polity to rights principles in Justice Kennedy’s
decisions, no discussion of the relationship between rights advocated
by Justice Kennedy and the lived lives of persons, and no discussion
of why the “Kennedy doctrine” violates equality and liberty principles
in prior cases and under the Constitution more directly.
By not exploring some of the above issues in Justice Kennedy’s
decisions, the authors seem to accept the formalist-realist divide. And
the Kennedy doctrine is all about the realism of Kennedy and the
Justices that signed on to the opinions as putting into law their own
political ideologies.
4.

Andrew Koppelman

“Beyond Levels of Scrutiny: Windsor and the
Bare Desire to Harm”

In this superb article, one of
what the Equal Protection Clause
Windsor into what he has long
sexual-orientation classifications in

our nation’s foremost scholars of
means wants to fit his analysis of
been examining: whether having
laws is a denial of equal protection

124. Id. at 949.
125. Id. at 952–53.
126. See id. at 951 (positing that, for Kennedy, “the desire to protect a
traditional moral understanding of marriage became in itself animus.”).
127. See id. at 959–60. An “equality interest” is a right “to be protected from
knowledge of civil and moral disagreement with the choices one has
made in everyday life, in the interests of advancing equality,” while a
“liberty interest” is “the right to live as they choose, to express
affection, to be who they are in public unmolested by harassment, to
visit each other in hospital rooms, etc.” Maggie Gallagher, Why
Accommodate? Reflections on the Gay Marriage Culture Wars, 5 Nw.
J.L. & Soc. Pol’y 260, 270–71 (2010).
128. See Gallagher & Duncan, supra note 81, at 951 (“The difference between
a desire to harm and a desire to affirm . . . becomes invisible in this
constitutional ideology.”).
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of the law.129 Rather than analyzing what the Court did and offering
reasons why it did it through an analysis of Model 2 Court decision
making, Koppelman interprets Windsor so that it can be viewed as
sustaining his constitutional theory of what equal protection before
the law means. Thus, it is a Model 1, not a Model 2, analysis of Court
decision making. It is a unidirectional explanation of a Court decision
based on analysis principles. It reads as if Koppelman accepts the
formalist-realist divide, even though he does not. It is similar in this
regard to Cass Sunstein’s unsuccessful effort to fit Romer and
Lawrence into his argument for minimalism in Court decision
making.130
Koppelman begins by explaining why DOMA did not classify on
the basis of sexual orientation, but instead classified on the basis of
sex. Next, he examines the “bare desire to harm” cases, such as
Romer, in which the Court invalidates a statute without expressly
elevating the level of scrutiny. In this class of equal protection cases
“the statute targets a narrowly defined group and then imposes on it
disabilities that are so broad and undifferentiated as to bear no
discernible relationship to any legitimate governmental interest.”131
Koppelman argues that DOMA was such a statute and concludes his
article by examining the curious place of federalism in the Windsor
Court’s reasoning.
In applying equal protection principles in this article, I have some
quibbles, such as why Koppelman downplays the innovative quality of
and increase in scrutiny of gender classifications in the VMI case.132
However, a more basic problem with Koppelman’s article is that
Windsor involves both equal protection and due process liberty
principles, individually and as related to each other, in relationship to
polity principles, and in terms of the lived lives of persons. Windsor,
in light of Lawrence, has a more complex set of principles and social
constructions that can be understood by asking whether sexual
129. Koppelman, supra note 83, at 1047–53.
130. See Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism
on the Supreme Court 150–57 (1999) (explaining Romer’s silence in
regards to Bowers v. Hardwick was a result of the Court’s subminimalist
approach); supra note 32; see also Kahn, supra note 2, at 191–98
(explaining that Sunstein’s Theory of Minimalism does not explain
Lawrence and Romer because it does not (i) “reject the status quo as
neutral”; (ii) discuss “the social construction of rights or polity
principles”; and (iii) determine when minimalism or maximalism may be
a better strategy in any particular situation).
131. Koppelman, supra note 83, at 1046–47.
132. Id. at 1048–49 (citing to United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996),
merely to provide the Court’s description of what intermediate scrutiny
is to be used with gender-based classifications).
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orientation is like race and gender, especially when the sexual
orientation classification is about the rights of same-sex couples to
marry.133
An example of this problem is Koppelman’s support for the
BLAG argument that:
A marriage between a man and a woman would fall within
DOMA’s definition even if one or both spouses were
homosexual. Similarly, the marriage of two men would fall
outside the definition even if both were heterosexual. There is
no question, however, that DOMA has a disproportionate
impact on individuals with a homosexual orientation. 134

BLAG is trying to limit the impact of the case for future gay rights,
and Koppelman falls for it completely.135 We can see the limitations of
the BLAG argument in Justice Kennedy’s Lawrence opinion and
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion where they talk of their
concern for the lack of equal respect for gay men and lesbians, and
their agreement that the right to liberty and equal protection are not
that different.136 One must see Justice Kennedy’s argument in
Windsor as resting on that formulation, and not simply on an analysis
of the difference between race, gender, and sexual-orientation
classifications under the tiered equal protection analysis.
By siphoning off the liberty, imputation of inferiority, and history
of discrimination arguments, Koppelman has set up a doctrinal
structure he thinks will win—simply as an equal protection case under
his view of what equal protection means. He does this rather than
explore the equal protection principles and the social constructions
that support them that are in Lawrence and Windsor.
Koppelman writes:
The Court could have disposed of Windsor on sex
discrimination grounds. Why didn’t it do that? This would have
been doctrinally tidy and would not have required the Court to
craft any new law. On the other hand, it would have reached
the question that the Court avoided in Perry, effectively
declaring the presumptive invalidity of every law in the country
133. Id. at 1051–52.
134. Brief on the Merits for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal Advisory
Group of the U.S. House of Representatives at 25 n.7, United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (Jan. 22, 2013) (No. 12-307); Koppelman,
supra note 83, at 1051.
135. Koppelman, supra note 83, at 1048.
136. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003); id. at 581 (O’Connor,
J., concurring).
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denying same-sex couples the right to marry. The Court was
not eager to reach that issue. 137

Koppelman is asking why the Court did not follow his theory
of why DOMA denies equal protection under the law.
The answer is that, under Model 2 decision making, the Supreme
Court applies principles that do not draw on tidy theories and
analyses of what those principles are or what scholars want them to
be. Koppelman analyzes Court decision making in the same manner
as many legalists, which is to analyze these cases as if they can be
understood as primarily or only formalist principles, even though they
cannot be understood in those terms. Moreover, unfortunately, such
formalist analyses lead Koppelman to conclude that DOMA
represents simply a sound application of a Romer-type equal
protection principle that “[t]he Constitution’s guarantee of equality
must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm
a politically unpopular group cannot justify disparate treatment of
that group,”138 when in fact this was not so. In fact, the case rested on
due process liberty principles and a more complex view of what a
denial of equal protection means and the relationship between those
principles in light of the lived lives of same-sex couples.139 In doing so
it was not minimalist, nor was it less maximalist than Koppelman’s
interpretation of the application of Equal Protection that would have
“effectively declar[ed] the presumptive invalidity of every law in the
country denying same-sex couples the right to marry.”140 I say this
because basing the right to same-sex marriage on both equal
protection and due process liberty principles and the social
constructions in support of those principles will be much more
transformative of gay rights.
5.

Ernest A. Young

“Is There a Federal Definitions Power?”

In a fascinating and complex article, Young asks whether DOMA
violates what he calls the federal definitions power.141 In this Model 1
analysis of a doctrine that none of the justices in Windsor chose to
explore, we see some similar problems that I explored in the
Koppelman article. It simply does not get into what the Windsor
137. Koppelman, supra note 83, at 1058.
138. Id. at 1072 (quoting United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693
(2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
139. See supra note 63.
140. Koppelman, supra note 83, at 1.
141. Young, supra note 85.
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Court did as a result of its engaging in Model 2, bidirectional decision
making. Yet there are some differences from the Koppelman
contribution. Although a foremost expert on the structural limits of
congressional and state powers and how to interpret those powers
when they are viewed as clashing, Young does not try to shoehorn the
analysis into a prescribed path. Because “DOMA simply ruled out for
federal purposes one particular aspect of some states’ laws,” those
involving same-sex marriage, “it offered no federal definition of th[e]
term [marriage], and instead simply incorporated state law on every
other aspect of what it means to be a ‘lawful’ marriage.”142 Moreover,
he writes, “|t]he sky will not fall if Congress is denied, in areas
outside its enumerated powers, the power to alter this traditional
relationship between state and federal law.”143
Young’s important contribution to the Symposium is based on a
Model 1 understanding of Court decision making because there is no,
or perhaps I should say only a very limited, discussion of the
relationship of these rights principles,144 which undergird polity
principles such as separation of powers, and the powers of the
national government and the states. Also, because Windsor is not
based on federalism principles alone, and when push comes to shove,
rights principles trump the polity principle of deference to states to
decide who can marry, the applicability of Young’s contribution to
what the marriage cases mean is limited.
B.

Institutional Analyses
1.

Robert F. Nagel

“Same-Sex Marriage, Federalism, and Judicial Supremacy”

Robert J. Nagel is a renowned scholar of the Supreme Court,
American constitutional law, and the jurisprudence of Justice
Kennedy. This article is based on a Model 2 view of Court decision
making. It centers on the relationship of polity and rights principles in
a wide range of Kennedy decisions, as a way to understand the place
of polity and rights principles in the Windsor decision.
As to polity principles, Nagel emphasizes that Justice Kennedy
supports a weak form of federalism.145 When there are conflicts among
142. Id. at 1291.
143. Id.
144. Young does mention another article where he argues that American
opinions regarding same-sex marriage changed so quickly because of
federalism. Id. at 1276–77; see also Ernest A. Young, Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty as Federalism Strategies: Lessons from the Same-Sex Marriage
Debate, 85 U. Colo. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014).
145. Nagel, supra note 87, at 1121.
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the states, especially on issues involving constitutional rights, Justice
Kennedy favors national government and Supreme Court power, that
is, judicial supremacy.146 Nagel writes:
In fact, taken as a whole, Justice Kennedy’s record
demonstrates a deep fear of political disintegration; therefore,
his support for federalism is limited to circumstances where the
assertion of state power does not seriously challenge—or in some
way actually enhance—the authority of the central government.
The notion that he would allow a deeply divisive issue like
same-sex marriage to be decided in a variety of ways in states
across the country is inconsistent with his deeply held view
about the need for unchallenged, central authority.147

Kennedy also has a commitment to judicial supremacy. Nagel writes,
“Perversely, the looser the conception of law, the more crucial seems
that institutional apex of central authority, the Supreme Court.”148
Conflicts between state and federal authority are most significant
when states defy constitutional judgments of the Supreme Court. This
is because Court decisions are the highest expression of the centralized
authority and the supreme law of the land.149 One can see also another
core polity principle of Justice Kennedy, which is his distrust of
politics, especially on questions of individual rights.150 For Justice
Kennedy, it is important on such issues that the Court is insulated
from “parochial political pressures”—as in Romer and Lawrence,
where state statutes were invalidated as being inconsistent with the
Constitution,151 or in Brown v. Plata,152 where Justice Kennedy wrote
an opinion that upheld a decree that California release 46,000
prisoners system-wide because prison conditions threatened “the
essence of human dignity” and explained the state’s noncompliance in
part on “a lack of political will.”153 Here, as in many of Justice
Kennedy’s decisions, the relationship of rights and polity principles is
key, and usually rights principles trump polity principles.
In Romer, the Court held that states are not allowed to write
laws which are based on “the bare desire to harm,” especially when a
146. Id. at 1123–29.
147. Id. at 1121.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1123–24.
150. See id. at 1124–27.
151. Id. at 1124.
152. 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
153. Id. at 1928, 1936; Nagel, supra note 87, at 1126–27.
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politically weak minority is involved.154 In Casey, the decisions about
whether to abort a fetus must belong to women because it is “central
to personal dignity and autonomy,” “concept of existence,” and what
the “mystery of human life” means to them.155 And the Court cannot
surrender to political pressure; moreover, the Court must remain
steadfast to women because the reasons for the right of abortion
choice in Roe have not changed, and are even more a part of the rule
of law because women continue to rely on this right in their lives.156
Even though Nagel does not explore the social construction
process of Justice Kennedy as he decides whether something should be
a right, it is quite clear that Nagel views Justice Kennedy as asking
what the rights principle should be—in light of the lived lives
of persons.
Also the polity principle as to whether the Court should trust
politics or the Court, and courts in general, to make decisions is built
upon a concern that political leaders are not trustworthy when rights
are at issue, particularly the rights of minorities and the politically
weak. The legitimacy of the Supreme Court and the rule of law are at
stake were the Court not to act accordingly.157
We see Justice Kennedy deciding what “our national legal norms
and traditions” are, such as not allowing an “irrational act of hatred”
in Romer,158 or the threat to “human dignity” in Brown v. Plata,159 or
the denial of basic human rights to gay men and lesbians in
Lawrence.160
An indication of the subtlety of the Nagel argument, and perhaps
a problem with it, is that one can ask why DOMA was overturned.
Nagel does speak of the “bare desire to harm” principle in Romer and

154. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996); Nagel, supra note 87, at
1125.
155. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 851 (1992); Nagel, supra note 87, at 1128. Justice Kennedy was a
co-author of this opinion. Id.
156. See Nagel, supra note 87, at 1128 (“The . . . Justices declare that they
cannot create the impression that they will ‘surrender’ to political
pressure. To those who have accepted the ruling in Roe, ‘the
Court . . . undertakes to remain steadfast.’ To overrule that decision, to
give in to political ‘fire,’ would amount to a ‘breach of faith.’”(footnotes
omitted) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 867–68)).
157. Id. at 1124.
158. Id. at 1125.
159. Id. at 1127. (quoting Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011)).
160. Id. at 1124.

1328

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 3·2014
Understanding United States v. Windsor and the Symposium Contributions
Using Unilateral and Bilateral Models of Supreme Court Decision Making

used in Windsor.161 Nagel suggests that state same-sex marriage laws
did not challenge the centralized authority of the national
government, a polity principle that is important to Justice
Kennedy.162 But why is DOMA unconstitutional? It must be that
DOMA violates individual rights important to Kennedy, as defined in
his majority opinion in Lawrence.
Justice Kennedy does not say it, but it must be that, because
DOMA did not respect the principles in Romer and the rights
principles in Lawrence, and was not a key statement of national
policy on marriage, DOMA was not constitutional.
Therefore, without directly discussing whether Windsor will lead
to a right to same-sex marriage, this article provides much evidence
that it will. But to say this, one must make some conclusions about
the jurisprudence of Justice Kennedy that Nagel is not willing to
make. When push comes to shove for Justice Kennedy, important
rights principles will trump polity principles. In fact, his polity
principles about trusting courts or politics also suggest that rights
principles are more important to Kennedy than polity principles
alone. That is why Justice Kennedy supports a weak form of
federalism.
2.

Robin Fretwell Wilson

“Marriage of Necessity: Same-Sex Marriage and
Religious Liberty Protections”

This contribution is a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the
politics within states (called Enacting Jurisdictions or EJ) that now
allow same-sex marriage, along with the prospects of same-sex
marriage being approved in additional states in the future. Professor
Fretwell Wilson is a member of a group of scholars that does not take
a position on same-sex marriage, but argues for robust protections for
religious objectors who adhere to a heterosexual view of marriage.163
This article documents the history of the spread of same-sex
marriage by judicial decision, state statute, and ballot initiative, as
well as the political, public opinion, and demographic factors that are
present in states that do and do not recognize a right to same-sex
marriage. It also documents how extensive bargaining for a religious
liberty exception was key to states approving same-sex marriage, with
the religious exception provisions “nudging” same-sex marriage laws

161. Id. at 1125, 1129; see also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675,
2693 (2013).
162. Nagel, supra note 87, at 1129.
163. Fretwell Wilson, supra note 89, at 1161 n.†.
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over the top.164 Moreover, where jurisdictions enacted same-sex
marriage, there was quick passage of laws to provide religious
exemptions.165 Fretwell Wilson finds that the political terrain in favor
of same-sex marriage is nearly exhausted;166 however, court decisions
and rapidly changing public opinion in support of same-sex marriage
in most states will result in same-sex marriage in the not-too-distant
future.167
Therefore, Fretwell Wilson offers advice for both proponents and
opponents of same-sex marriage. Even in tougher political terrain, she
advises that those who care about marriage equality can continue to
sew up legislative victories; the price tag in the short run is to agree
now to robust religious protections for dissenters rather than wait for
overwhelming political support for same-sex marriage, because they go
hand in hand with approval of same-sex marriage.168
For opponents of same-sex marriage, Fretwell Wilson advises that
the best strategy is to cement meaningful religious exceptions now,
trading robust religious exemptions for the right to same-sex
marriage.169 This will mute the impact on those who oppose same-sex
marriage. Thus, Fretwell Wilson is arguing for a pragmatist approach
to same-sex marriage by those who oppose it on ideological or
religious grounds.
What are the implications of this great weight of information and
analysis of the politics surrounding same-sex marriage—and for
whether a unidirectional Model 1 or bidirectional Model 2 analysis can
best explain the role of the Supreme Court as a venue for social
change? This article does not analyze cases from the inside out and
show how the Court brings the outside social world into its decision
making. Rather, it makes Model 1 assumptions as to what causes the
establishment of the right to same-sex marriage—that is, what causes
this social change.
However, there is evidence in this article that Court decision
making in support of same-sex marriage can influence the politics in
support of same-sex marriage, because federal court decisions such as
Lawrence and Windsor, as applied by federal and state court justices,
have resulted, now or in the near future, in the establishment of the
164. See id. at 1186–1212.
165. Id. at 1182–93. However, when same-sex marriage arises from judicial
decisions, states are less likely to have protections for religious objectors.
Id. at 1176–93.
166. See id. at 1218–28.
167. See id. at 1235–41.
168. Id. at 1228.
169. Id. at 1242.
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right of same-sex marriage in additional states.170 While public opinion
and demographic data makes some states more prone to support
same-sex marriage, court decisions can move the process along, and
Fretwell Wilson suggests they will in the future.171 Therefore, the
argument that bidirectional, Model 2, Court decision making can have
an independent effect on the establishment of the right to same-sex
marriage is confirmed by Fretwell Wilson’s study, and this will
increase in the future.
Fretwell Wilson presents a wealth of information that public
opinion,172 party control of state legislatures and governorships,173
percent of religious persons,174 and level of education correlate with
whether a state will support same-sex marriage.175 Model 1 political
scientists who seek explanations from outside the court for social
change must be wary of viewing these data as simple support for their
views because this is not a study of the relationship between external
factors and internal court effects on social change.
However, one should not conclude that unidirectional
explanations alone could explain the movement toward a right to
same-sex marriage. For, as Fretwell Wilson demonstrates throughout
the article and with regard to her advice about policy, Court
decisions, including Windsor, influence the politics in states.176
The detailed timelines as to where same-sex marriage states are
now and how they got there, and the presentation of public opinion
data at the state level, will be of use to legal scholars, political
scientists, and historians interested in same-sex marriage and the role
of courts and more directly politically accountable institutions on
social change. But it is only the beginning. Also, Fretwell Wilson
provides no discussion of the complex relationship between Court
action and politics, and vice versa. As Michael McCann demonstrates,
there is a feedback effect between court decisions and political action

170. Id. at 1168 fig.1, 1179–80.
171. Id. at 1195–210.
172. E.g., id. at 1199 (reporting that the streak of passing same-sex marriage
bans ended abruptly in 2012 “after the tide of national public opinion
had shifted in favor of same-sex marriage”).
173. Id. at 1211–12.
174. Id. at 1212–13.
175. Id. at 1213–14.
176. See supra note 170.
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because court decisions restructure the preferences of political
actors.177
Also, in this article there is no discussion of legal conflicts
between religious exceptions for those who oppose same-sex marriage
and state anti-discrimination laws. I mention this, not because
Fretwell Wilson should discuss these in this article, but because such
conflicts could influence legislatures and courts in the movement
toward a right to same-sex marriage.
Finally, one also can see from this article—specifically when
Fretwell Wilson documents Court action since Windsor and while she
extends advice to proponents and opponents of same-sex marriage—
that Windsor already has had an important impact on the movement
toward a right to same-sex marriage. Thus, it will have a long staying
power, for reasons I explored above.
3.

Susan J. Becker

“The Role of Judicial Independence in the Continuing
Quest for LGBT Equality”

Susan Becker makes an important contribution to the
Symposium. She demonstrates that court decisions extending equal
rights to LGBT litigants are not the result of improper judicial
activism. Rather, they result from “an appropriately restrained
application of law to facts, thus moving the judiciary closer to the
elusive ideal of judicial independence.”178
Judicial independence requires that judges “resolve cases with
fidelity to the rule of law established in case precedents, statutes, and
procedural rules. Decisions rendered in adherence to this principle are
immunized from improper influences such as personal interests,
religious beliefs, concern for popular opinion, and the desire to please
special interest groups.”179
Since Becker says she cannot measure judicial independence, she
defines eight judicial decision-making models that meet her definition
of judges engaging in judicial independence, including Formalism,
Balanced Realism, and Constrained Pragmatism.180 Those that do not
meet her ideal type of judicial independence, in order of decreasing
judicial independence, include decision making that is based on

177. See Michael W. McCann, Rights at Work: Pay Equity Reform
and the Politics of Legal Mobilization 135–37 (1994) (discussing
a political process model of legal mobilization).
178. Becker, supra note 86, at 866.
179. Id. at 866–67 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
180. Id. at 896–97 tbl.1; see infra note 192 and accompanying text.
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Realism, Pragmatism, Attitudinal, Strategic, and judges acting
as Oracles.181
After a short history of the failure of judges to be judicially
independent in their decision making in LGBT cases,182 Becker offers a
detailed account of pro-equality marriage cases in Hawaii,
Massachusetts, California, and Iowa.183 In these cases, Becker finds
that judges “applied well-established legal principles to an extensive
record of highly credible evidence to reject antiquated rationales for
excluding same-sex couples from secular marriage.”184
Becker’s fine analysis of the lower federal court cases on DOMA
prior to Windsor shows judges met her standards of judicial
independence.185 Moreover, Republican presidents appointed a
majority of the justices who decided these pro-marriage equality
cases.186 These cases centered on the application of equal protection
principles and discussions of the level of scrutiny that courts should
use.187 As with the state cases, federal judges used an extensive
analysis of data and studies to decide these cases.188
Therefore, we see these courts employing Model 2 Court decision
making in applying precedent, equal protection principles, and data
on the lived lives of same-sex couples. The data and studies help
courts to socially construct what the right to marriage means in terms
of equality principles, when compared to opposite-sex couples.
Becker is stunned, as are Koppelman and Marcus—and most
observers, Becker tells us—that the Supreme Court did not decide the
case on equal protection grounds with a decision that would decide
the constitutionality of DOMA in Windsor on a heightened level of

181. Id.
182. See id. at 897–905. The first case seeking same-sex marriage, Baker v.
Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), faced similar challenges, with the
U.S. Supreme Court not finding a constitutional violation when Minnesota
denied the plaintiffs’ request for a marriage license. Id. at 907.
183. Id. at 909–21.
184. Id. at 919.
185. See id. at 921–31.
186. Id. at 922–24 tbl.2.
187. The First Circuit employed a variant of rational basis because the
legislation affected unpopular groups. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t Health
& Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2884,
2887 (2013); Becker, supra note 86, at 926. The Second Circuit identified
several factors for determining the level of scrutiny and found that
intermediate scrutiny was the most appropriate. Windsor v. United
States, 699 F.3d 169, 181 (2d Cir. 2012); Becker, supra note 86, at 933–34.
188. Becker, supra note 86, at 929–30, 935–36.
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scrutiny for sexual orientation classifications—the central issue in
lower federal court cases.189
Many legal scholars and litigators were astonished by Windsor
being decided on due process liberty grounds, because they think in
formalist doctrinal terms. However, bidirectional Model 2 Supreme
Court decision making allows the Court to choose the doctrinal
principles it wishes to consider, usually from precedent, and by
looking at the lived lives of same-sex and opposite-sex couples, in
Windsor. When it does so, the Court can decide whether DOMA’s
lack of recognition for same-sex married couples denies them the equal
protection of the law. However, Model 2 decision making does not
preclude the Court from deciding that DOMA also denied same-sex
couples a liberty not unlike the denial of liberty in Lawrence—but
even more significant. This is because the Court compares the
principles in prior cases and the social constructions in the case before
the Court with principles and the social construction of marriage
in Windsor.
Litigators and legal scholars trained in doctrine and advocacy
think vertically. They do not think the same way as Supreme Court
justices who can be much more creative, as they were in Windsor:
linking the polity principle of deference to state authority over who
can marry, to the equal protection principle of laws based on animus
and bare desire to harm, and to the denial of liberty under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. This creativity is most
evident in cases that break new paths in the law, such in Windsor.
Finally, Becker concludes the article by arguing that the Court
was not judicially independent in Windsor. Rather she argues that
because the Windsor court did not base its decision on the equal
protection structure of levels of scrutiny to sexual orientation
classifications, as debated in the lower federal courts, it does not
engage in a decision-making process that meets her standards for a
judicially independent Court.190 She then opines that the Court must
have been engaging in either pragmatic decision making, considering
that the failure to apply 1,000 federal statutes could affect hundreds
of thousands of people, or constrained pragmatism to avoid having
heightened equal protection principles be applied to state bans on
same-sex marriage.191
The problem with this analysis is that judicial independence is
not secured by “Formalism,” a type of Court decision making that
brings a court closest to judicial independence. Nor is it a product of
“Balanced Realism,” a form of decision making informed primarily by
189. Id. at 943.
190. Id. at 944.
191. Id. at 944–45.
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unique facts and the law in a case. Nor is judicial independence
secured by “Constrained Pragmatism,” which Becker defines as
“decid[ing] cases on narrow grounds especially when law is uncertain
or evolving, considering the impact on institutions and society.”192
These categories simply do not fit with Supreme Court decision
making, where there is a mutual construction of formalist principles
and social constructions of the lived lives of persons in light of
precedent. Nor does the Supreme Court gain its judicial independence,
which may be a reference to legitimacy as well, by centering on the
unique facts in a case or on narrow grounds when the law is
uncertain. The Supreme Court gets its legitimacy and independence
by not being so constrained, especially when it is carving out new
paths in the law.
4.

Nancy Scherer

“Viewing the Supreme Court’s Marriage Cases Through
the Lens of Political Science”

The attitudinal approach to explaining Supreme Court decision
making is based on the premise that justices decide cases based on the
liberal or conservative policies they desire.193 Liberal justices vote for
liberal policies; conservative justices vote for conservative policies.
The Court decision-making process, choices of what polity and rights
principles are at issue in a case, and the social construction of a
case—for example, what marriage is, in light of rights principles, the
role of precedent, etc.—are simply window dressings; they have no
effect on case outcomes.
As a unidirectional model, attitudinalism suffers from the pitfalls
I explored above.194 Reliance on attitudinalism shows what happens
when scholars accept the formalist-realist divide and use an empirical
behavioral rather than empirical interpretive method to analyze Court
decision making.195 It is the most pointed example of an attempt by
scholars to explain Supreme Court decision making as unidirectional
Model 1, and to reject the Model 2 bidirectional approach. All Court
decision making is done by outside-the-Court processes based on the
justices’ policy desires.

192. Id. at 896–97 tbl.1. Pragmatism is defined as “giv[ing] equal or greater
weight to the potential overall impact of decision on institutions and
society rather than securing just result for the litigants in the case.” Id.
193. Scherer, supra note 88, at 1131; see also Segal & Spaeth, supra note
49, at 86–97.
194. See supra Part I.B.
195. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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One can see some of the problems with attitudinalism in this
article. Scherer starts her analysis of Windsor by noting there were
two legal issues for the Court to consider: standing and whether
DOMA was “unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause.”196 However, we did not know what rights and polity
principles the Court would find applicable. In fact, several Symposium
participants were astonished that the case was not decided on equal
protection grounds. In fact, the Court decided Windsor on both equal
protection and due process liberty grounds informed by the polity
principle of deference to states to decide who can marry.
Therefore, attitudinalism tries to “predict” case outcomes after
the case was decided. Scherer then must “predict” Justice Kennedy’s
vote. No problem, Justice Kennedy is a libertarian, like the Cato
Institute.197 Therefore, he believes government should “stay out of my
personal business.”198 Ask Professor Nagel whether it is so easy to
characterize Justice Kennedy’s political philosophy about rights.
Moreover, Nagel demonstrates Justice Kennedy’s polity principles
along with his view of rights explain the majority opinion in Windsor.
Scherer continues, “by using the current metrics for judicial
ideology,” a code word for who is a liberal and conservative justice on
the Court, and adding in “Kennedy’s political leanings towards
libertarianism, the attitudinal method correctly predicted the votes of
the justices in Windsor . . . without any reference to [precedent] or
constitutional method of interpretation.”199 Legal arguments “provide
cover for the true rationale behind the justices’ votes: to see their own
policy preferences become the law of the land.”200 Not only are most
Supreme Court cases unanimous decisions, but on most landmark
decisions, there are non-predictable justices, that is, swing voters, and
it is impossible to know what each liberal and conservative justice will
do in a case.
I also want to comment on Scherer’s discussion that justices shift
to a strategic mode of thinking when they cannot secure the first
policy outcome that they desire, as she says occurred in Perry v.
Hollingsworth.201 The application of the strategic model to Perry is
educated speculation, and it is speculation given the many possible
scenarios Scherer provides. The discussion of Justice Ginsburg’s fear

196. Scherer, supra note 88, at 1140–41.
197. Id. at 1141–42.
198. Id. at 1142.
199. Id. at 1143.
200. Id.
201. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); Scherer, supra note 88, at 1156–59.
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of political backlash as proof of strategic voting also has flaws.202 Why
did Justice Ginsburg fear political backlash in Perry, but support the
majority opinion in Windsor, which introduces rights for same-sex
couples that are to be based on both equal protection and due process
liberty grounds?203 Justices do not vote simply on instrumental
attitudinal or strategic grounds—and our nation is better for it.
C.

Policy Analyses

1.

Helen M. Alvaré

“Same Sex Marriage and the ‘Reconceiving’ of Children”

This article is a criticism of Windsor and Perry for their dramatic
reversal from the long-held view that state recognition of marriage is
importantly associated with the place of procreation in marriage.204
This is a criticism of the social construction of marriage and adults’
relationship to children in family law in general and, more specifically,
in the right to same-sex marriage cases. It explores the shift in family
law that in the past had centered on a concern for the best interests
of the child.205 Courts in the past questioned whether adults’ duties to
children would be fulfilled when adults exercised a claimed right.206
The article also emphasizes that in the past family law “presumed
that children’s welfare was a direct product of adults’ satisfaction of
their duties toward children,” while the “cases approving same-sex
marriage speculated that children will benefit indirectly from the
state’s granting rights (i.e., marriage recognition) to the petitioning
adults.”207
In applying the questions, this is a Model 1 analysis because there
is an assumption that changes in principles in family law will hurt
children,208 rather than seeing Court decision making as a mutual
construction of rights principles and the realism of the lived lives of
same-sex couples and their children. The objective of the scholar
seems to be to influence courts away from the premises in family and
202. Scherer, supra note 88, at 1152.
203. Cf. id. at 1156–57 (proposing that Justice Ginsburg favored a wait-andsee approach since Perry “would have affected all thirty-three state laws
banning same-sex marriage”).
204. Alvaré, supra note 90, at 831–35.
205. Courts presume that “parents act in best interests of their children,”
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000), or parents will do so based on
“natural bonds of affection.” Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
206. Alvaré, supra note 90, at 845.
207. Id. at 843.
208. Id. at 851–52.
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right-to-marry cases, and or garner support among advocacy groups
who seek to change these premises in family law. There is no
discussion of the decision making by the Court. Rather, this article
centers on the negative effects of the marriage cases and the rights
granted to same-sex couples in family law on children. It assumes that
the Court makes decisions without the backward effects of justices
and judges defining principles in light of the world outside the Court.
2.

Frances Goldscheider

“Rescuing the Family from the Homophobes and Antifeminists:
Analyzing the Recently Developed and Already Eroding
‘Traditional’ Notions of Faily and Gender”

These Symposium remarks briefly review sociological data on
single parent families, heterosexual families with the man employed
and woman at home, and families with both parents working, and ask
how these findings apply to LGBT parents and families.209 All these
studies show that two parents are better for children than single
parent homes, and this should apply to same-sex couples.210 Viewing
families historically, families in subsistence agriculture did not have
clearly separate roles: men and woman were involved in training
children to be good farmers and spouses, and women also were doing
hard, physical labor.211 This and other historical data suggest that the
vision of men and woman in separate spheres was recent.212 Now, most
women expect to work and most men expect their partners to work.213
Today, men’s involvement in the family has increased, and that is
good for the family.214
Goldscheider writes:
Sadly, few people would bother if gay and lesbian parents
were individual single parents. Having two committed parents is
very helpful for children. What children need, then, is two
parents who love them, who are committed to them throughout
their trials and triumphs. More parents are better than fewer. In
every study I have ever seen, stable, long-term committed
relationships best serve the interests of children and parents.

209. Goldscheider, supra note 91, at 1043.
210. Id. at 1031, 1044.
211. Id. at 1037–38.
212. Id. at 1037 fig.1.
213. Id. at 1039.
214. Id. at 1040.
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. . . Therefore, . . . what should the law and public policy do?
We want to encourage parents to stay together.215

These remarks are about what is best for children, without a direct
discussion of the Perry and Windsor cases or how they were decided.
One can surmise that the remarks suggest that the sexual orientation
of a couple is less significant to the welfare children than having two
parents who are committed to their relationship and the children in
their home. The move away from separate gender roles also implies
that, if same-sex couples can marry and gain the economic advantages
of doing so, then clearly children are better off than if same-sex
parents had no right to marry.
There is no discussion of Perry or Windsor or Court decision
making. Any relationship between them and the best family policies
must is left to the audience to surmise.

Conclusion
In recent years, the Supreme Court has not acted as many would
have predicted. Considering that Republican presidents have
appointed the majority of justices, all bets should have been on seeing
a conservative shift in the Court and a substantial roll back of
protection for individual rights. However, the opposite has proven
true. The Court has upheld protections for individual rights in many
instances and expanded protections in others. The Windsor decision is
a prime example of this trend. Only a bidirectional analysis can fully
explain these decisions. As this Article has shown, with the help of
the excellent scholarship from the other contributors to this
symposium, embracing a bidirectional analysis allows one to consider
all factors involved and to more clearly see the reasons behind the
Windsor decision.

215. Id. at 1042–43 (footnotes omitted).

1339

